| | | | Special Issue on Social Dilemmas | | | | 3. | The psychology of social dilemmas: A review Original Research Article
Pages 125-141
Paul A.M. Van Lange, Jeff Joireman, Craig D. Parks, Eric Van Dijk Highlights ► This article provides a review on the psychology of social dilemmas, the central topic of this special issue. ► This article provides a careful treatment of the definition of social dilemmas, theories, and recent developments. ► This article introduces relatively unfamiliar readers to the growing field of social dilemmas. | | | | 4. | The price of anarchy in social dilemmas: Traditional research paradigms and new network applications Original Research Article
Pages 142-153
Vincent Mak, Amnon Rapoport Highlights ► Social dilemma research largely concerned withwhetherinefficient outcomes occur. ► Much less emphasis on theextentof inefficiency. ► Introduce the price of anarchy (PoA) to quantify inefficiency in social dilemmas. ► Illustrate notion with examples from well-known and network settings. ► Introduce social dilemmas in networks, hitherto rarely experimented on. | | | | 5. | Markets as a structural solution to knowledge-sharing dilemmas Original Research Article
Pages 154-167
Boris Maciejovsky, David V. Budescu Highlights ► We propose markets as a new structural solution to knowledge-sharing dilemmas. ► Conflict of interest reduces knowledge sharing in groups but not in markets. ► The market's rules and communication structure guarantee its superior performance. ► We explain our findings within the theoretical framework of collective induction. | | | | 6. | Interindividual–intergroup discontinuity in the prisoner's dilemma game: How common fate, proximity, and similarity affect intergroup competition Original Research Article
Pages 168-180
Chester A. Insko, Tim Wildschut, Taya R. Cohen Highlights ► Investigated the classic problem as to when a set of individuals is perceived as a single entity. ► Assessed own-set entitativity, other-set entitativity, and competitive behavior. ► Manipulated the Campbell indices: common fate (or covariation), proximity, and similarity. ► Common fate increased both entitativities, fear, greed, and competitiveness. ► One path model included other-set entitativity and fear and another own-set entitativity and greed. | | | | 7. | Relative performance and implicit incentives in the intergroup prisoner's dilemma Original Research Article
Pages 181-190
Corinne Coen Highlights ► This paper provides a careful examination of the payoff matrix in the IPD. ► Implicit incentives often eliminate the dominance of a withholding strategy. ► When groups are tied, withholding cooperation is always the dominant strategy. ► In the IPD, when a group has more cooperators, cooperation is sometimes dominant. ► In the IPD, when a group has fewer cooperators, withholding is not always dominant. | | | | 8. | Social dilemmas between individuals and groups Original Research Article
Pages 191-205
Tamar Kugler, Gary Bornstein Highlights ► We study asymmetric social dilemmas between individuals and groups. ► We demonstrate that outcomes depend on player type and on conflict structure. ► We show that individuals outperform groups. ► Individuals' advantage results from better cooperation with other individuals. ► Groups' disadvantage results from difficulties in solving internal social dilemmas. | | | | 9. | Reciprocal trust mediates deep transfer of learning between games of strategic interaction Original Research Article
Pages 206-215
Ion Juvina, Muniba Saleem, Jolie M. Martin, Cleotilde Gonzalez, Christian Lebiere Highlights ► We investigate transfer of learning across two games of strategic interaction. ► Deep-level similarities facilitate transfer of learning across games. ► Surface similarities can either facilitate or hinder transfer. ► Learning an optimal solution is associated with development of reciprocal trust. ► Reciprocal trust facilitates transfer of learning across games. | | | | 10. | An experiment on Prisoner's Dilemma with confirmed proposals Original Research Article
Pages 216-227
Giuseppe Attanasi, Aurora García-Gallego, Nikolaos Georgantzís, Aldo Montesano Highlights ► We suggest a bargaining mechanism inducing efficient outcomes in social dilemmas. ► Bargaining can take place with only one leader or with two alternating leaders. ► The experimental test produces unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the lab. ► The presence of only one leader increases the likelihood of immediate cooperation. ► Subjects' strategies in Prisoner's Dilemma are seen as tacit communication devices. | | | | 11. | The role of Social Value Orientation in response to an unfair offer in the Ultimatum Game Original Research Article
Pages 228-239
Gokhan Karagonlar, David M. Kuhlman Highlights ► Prosocials accepted the unfair offer more than Individualists and Competitors. ► Expectations of the offer and judgments of its fairness were uninfluenced by SVO. ► In Study 1 Prosocials reported more positive emotion in response to the offer. ► In Study 2 Prosocials reported more positive perceptions of the proposer's motives. ► Results are best explained by emotion regulation than by altruistic punishment. | | | | 12. | Interest (mis)alignments in representative negotiations: Do pro-social agents fuel or reduce inter-group conflict? Original Research Article
Pages 240-250
Hillie Aaldering, Lindred L. Greer, Gerben A. Van Kleef, Carsten K.W. De Dreu Highlights ► We examine under what circumstances representative negotiators self-sacrifice. ► Interests of representative, constituency and adversary may or may not be aligned. ► Pro-socials self-sacrifice more than pro-selves when this benefits the constituency. ► Pro-socials self-sacrifice even more when this also hurts the negotiation adversary. | | | | 14. | Is behavioral pro-sociality game-specific? Pro-social preference and expectations of pro-sociality Original Research Article
Pages 260-271
Toshio Yamagishi, Nobuhiro Mifune, Yang Li, Mizuho Shinada, Hirofumi Hashimoto, Yutaka Horita, Arisa Miura, Keigo Inukai, Shigehito Tanida, Toko Kiyonari, Haruto Takagishi, Dora Simunovic Highlights ► Five games were conducted over three and a half years. ► Trust in the faith game was strongly correlated with behavior in all the other games. ► Expectations of other players' pro-social choices were correlated with game behavior in the other games. ► Participants used the same two dimensions in evaluating the game situation across all games. | | | | 15. | Social Value Orientation and information search in social dilemmas: An eye-tracking analysis Original Research Article
Pages 272-284
Susann Fiedler, Andreas Glöckner, Andreas Nicklisch, Stephan Dickert Highlights ► Information search and processing varies as a function of Social Value Orientation. ► An increase in deviation from pure individualists comes along with an increase in information search. ► Differences are observed in simple distribution tasks & complex strategic decisions. | | | | 16. | The bystander effect in an N-person dictator game Original Research Article
Pages 285-297
Karthik Panchanathan, Willem E. Frankenhuis, Joan B. Silk Highlights ► We study helping when a victim's welfare increases with the amount of help. ► We used a multi-player dictator to model these helping situations. ► Dictators transfer less when there are more dictators. ► This effect persisted despite eliminating uncertainty about others' behavior. ► People seem to treat many-to-one helping differently than other public goods. | | | | 17. | Ostracism and prosocial behavior: A social dilemma perspective Original Research Article
Pages 298-308
Daniel Balliet, D.Lance Ferris Highlights ► We apply a social dilemma analysis to prosocial behavior at work. ► This predicts future orientation moderates ostracism and prosocial behavior. ► Three studies (survey, experimental, field) test this prediction. ► Future orientation reduces the effect of ostracism on prosocial behavior at work. | | |