Discussion: View Thread

  • 1.  Anthropomorphizing Groups, Societies, Organizations

    Posted 11-05-2009 10:06
    Ronnie, this has been an interesting discussion and I think those interested in this topic might also want look at the literature about emergent phenomena.  One could argue that there is no "group behavior" because it is the individuals that actually behave.  But you could also say that people are made up of brains and limbic systems so really behavior should be studied at the neuronal and chemical level since clearly the neurons firing and chemical reactions are what is causing the person to behave.  One can take this clear down to the gene level saying if we really want to study behavior we need to understand what the genes are doing.  So which of these are right?  It depends on what you are interested in.  The behavior of people is an emergent phenomena of genes and neurons and chemicals, but it does not work very well to study behavior at that level, at least for complex behavior of any interest.  I know some people are working on doing just that and maybe someday we will be able to do it, but there are still many problems.  The emergent literature talks about things like multiple realization, where the same constellation of entities gives rise to different phenomena at the higher level.  Similarly, some organizational phenomena don't exist at the individual level but emerge at the group or organization level.  It makes sense to study the phenomena where it happens regardless of whether sub-phenomena are giving rise to it (which they inevitably are.)  But one has to be careful when specifying what they are studying.  Is culture an average of the individual's beliefs, values and norms, or is it the consensus of those things (we usually use the latter definition).  Measurement issues also arise when one anthropomorphizes without carefully considering the nature of the emerging phenomena.   So, as had been said previously, there emergent processes have properties that are independent though influenced by the parts that make them up.  As such, I think there is value in studying at multiple levels and across levels, but as in all areas, one has to do so carefully and treating an organization just like it was a person completely misses the complex reciprocal interplay between the two.

    Jeff Peterson

    ·       Sawyer 2002 [Emergence is sociology, AJS]
    ·      Chan 1998 [Functional relations among constructs in the same content domain at different levels of analysis, JAP]
    ·      Klein & Kozlowski 2000 [From micro to meso: Critical steps in conceptualizing and conducting multilevel research, ORM]
    ·      Morgenson & Hofmann 1999 [The structure and function of collective constructs, AMR]
    ·       Weick & Roberts 1993 [Collective mind in organizations, ASQ]




    On 11/3/09 3:43 PM, "Romie Littrell" <littrellaom@YAHOO.CO.NZ> wrote:

    I'm critiquing a research paper by a post-graduate student who has referenced a quotation from an article by Gray, Owen & Adams  (1996)  in which they anthropomorphise  "society", explaining society as "a series of social contracts between members of society and society itself". Society is a network of various kinds of linkages where people gather to do things. Society is not a conscious entity that does things of its own volition. Moreover, the things done there are transactions that occur in large numbers, at the volition of many people and institutions, motivated by a diverse array of reasons for engaging in them. People tell me what groups, societies, organisations did today, why it did that, what it is afraid of, what it is struggling to do, or what external influences are preventing it from accomplishing its intent. None of these statements is true. To re-emphasise, an organisation, group, society, or market is a place where people gather to do things, not a conscious entity that does things of its own volition that can be analysed as if it were a human being.

    Any agreement, disagreement, other ideas?

    Gray, R, Owen, D., & Adams, C. (1996). Accounting and Accountability; Changes and Challenges in Corporate Social and Environmental Reporting, Harlow: UK: Prentice-Hall Europe.



    Do not accustom yourself to use big words for little matters.-Samuel Johnson
    Romie F. Littrell, BA, MBA,PhD, FIAIR, An fánaí fiáin  
    AUT Business School N.Z., romie.littrell@aut.ac.nz
    http://www.romielittrellpubs.homestead.com/
    http://www.crossculturalcentre.homestead.com/
    Facilitator, Leadership & Management in Sub-Sahara Africa Conferences
    Contents copyright Romie F. Littrell



  • 2.  Anthropomorphizing Groups, Societies, Organizations

    Posted 11-06-2009 12:10
    David, I have to politely disagree with some of your conclusions.  To determine that risky shift has taken place you compare the average of the individuals' risk propensity with the collective decision (i.e. the group's decision).  Therefore, I would argue that the decision belongs to the group as an independent entity, and that there are characteristics of a group that don't exist in individuals until they form into a group and interact.  So I can properly compare things like amount of consensus, cooperation and the like between to groups. Yes, there are individual processes that lead to these group phenomena, but I could just as easily argue that your genetics are playing a role and therefore risky shift is really a chemical reaction and should be properly studied at that level (i.e. no individual does anything, it is a complex combination of organs interacting).  I could argue that we are measuring it at the individual because we don't yet understand how those organs are making the person behave.  It seems to me that many people are arbitrarily selecting the individual as the right level of analysis simply because we aren't sophisticated enough to measure at the chemical or chromosomal level (leaving aside discussions of free will and the like) and because it appears that the individual is an atomic unit.  Of course, I do think that this this it is the right level for many things, because there are things that emerge at the level of the individual that make sense studying at that level.   

    However, if I as a researcher am interested in comparing how some organizational factor (say different competitive strategies) impacts the amount of risky shift in groups, it requires me to take measures at the individual level, the group level and the organizational level.  And while people do determine the corporate strategy, it makes no sense to say that corporate strategy is an individual attribute.  Clearly the organization's strategy is a completely separate entity (I will avoid the ontological discussion of whether strategy is an abstraction or not), and it seems silly to me to say that we can't compare the performance of two organizations based on their strategy without measuring people.  Clearly there are individual variables, group variables and organization variables and depending on the questions that you ask you might need to cross one or more of those levels.

    Like you David, I tend to be attracted to the micro level and I see some people not being thoughtful in how they treat group and organizational phenomena, but I still see value in studying things at the higher levels.  While clearly people design and manufacture the products, it still is valuable to look at an organization and say "what is it about that company that allows them to consistently create innovative products?"   The answer to that may be creative individuals, well organized teams and organizational policies that reward risk-taking.  To me the question of where do you study something depends on what question you are trying to answer.  And while I like to study individuals, I do believe that it is often an arbitrary unit of convenience and is biased by our subjective experience of ourselves as a unified whole.

    On that note, I would also take mild exception to the idea that people are really all that integrated.  Research on areas like automaticity, and even things like split brain studies show that much of the unity in our consciousness and behavior is illusory.  The human brain is a sense making machine and much of what goes on is a post hoc reconstruction to justify and explain why we do the things we do.  But that is another topic for another day.

    Jeff Peterson

    On 11/6/09 8:40 AM, "David McLain" <david.mclain@SUNYIT.EDU> wrote:

    Interesting.

     

    This topic is an insight into why I concentrate my work in OB in theories of individual attitudes and behavior rather than theories of large groups and societies.

     

    Although group identification seems to lead to shifts in some attitudes it doesn't mean the group is a concrete entity.  It is often found that making a decision as a member of a group that will issue a collective decision tends to lead individuals to accept a greater amount of risk than if each individual were to make the decision alone.  This shift in risk acceptance is not a group phenomenon but is rather an individual phenomenon, occurring entirely in the cognitions of individuals.  One way to discourage oneself from thinking that a collective is a concrete entity is to ask if the phenomenon you are interested could be measured by measuring it at the level of the individual.  Usually this can be readily done.  If I want to measure the "risky shift", I can assess it by measuring the risk acceptance of individual group members in the conditions of individual choice or choice leading to a group decision.  A lessening of perceived personal responsibility, an individual-level phenomenon, is probably the best explanation rather than a "group shift toward risky decision making".  No cognition is conducted by a group, only by individuals that ultimately understand that decisions will be associated with the group rather than the individual.   

     

    Constructs measured at the group level, such as 'expectations of the reactions of others to my choice of behavior' (within the Theory of Planned Behavior), might be found to be expectations of the number of individuals or of how key individuals might react to the individual's choice.  It isn't a group reaction that is anticipated but the reactions of individuals in the group because the group is a non-entity--only individuals can behave in reaction to your choice.  

     

    An interesting example of how the distinction between group and individual choice was strengthened as an element of Western culture can be found in the principles underlying the Nuremburg trials of the late 40's.  Although the defendents were molded into collective identities with group rituals and depersonalizing rhetoric, the prosecution grounded the trial in personal responsibility--the individuals were tried and held responsible for the harm they caused.  They were not permitted to dissociate themselves from personal responsibility for decisions handed down or fostered by group images.

     

    Lately I have been introducing myself to neurological science and brain behavior as it might influence attitudes and behavior, in particular, decision making.  I think there is a lot to be learned but there are some interesting studies linking brain lesions with decision making.  One such finding is that specific brain lesions can lead to different risk behavior among gamblers.  If collective identity can increase or decrease neuronal activity in specific regions of the brain, then we have identified an influence on individual attitudes and behavior but that doesn't require the actual existence of the group, only perception of the existence of membership in the "group".  Some group phenomena may then more readily be measured by measuring the individual's brain activity or long term memory information about the "group".  

     

    One question raised by my reading of brain studies is, if the brain can isolate information processing about different issues, such as visual information, into regions of the cerebrum, then is it the individual or the region that is responsible for the individual's attitudes and behaviors?  If a lesion in one region causes behavior that conflicts with the patterns of behavior arising from other portions of the brain, where does responsibility lie?  In reality, the brain is well-integrated and should not produce many inconsistencies or conflicts.  The individual has mechanisms for setting rules that integrate that behavior responsibly and we can hold the individual responsible for managing those rules.  However, when a manager divides labor among several individuals and one individual misbehaves, lying on an accounting ledger, is the entirety of the individuals responsible? The integration may or may not expose all the individuals to information about the bad choice.  Generally, we need strong evidence to accuse and this leads us to one or a few individuals.

     

    So much for my 2.0 cents on a Friday.

     

    David McLain

    SUNY Institute of Technology

     



  • 3.  Anthropomorphizing Groups, Societies, Organizations

    Posted 11-06-2009 15:42

    Dear All, for those wanting to know more about "scientific realism" as opposed to any other "isms" (which are often confused with it, and certainly hostile to it), I recommend two short articles by Shelby Hunt in the Journal of Management Inquiry.

     

    For truth and realism in management research.  JMI, 2005

    On the rhetoric of qualitative methods:  Toward historically informed argumentation in management inquiry, 3(3) 221-234, 1994.

     

    Kim Boal

     

    From: Organizational Behavior Division Listserv [mailto:OB@AOMLISTS.PACE.EDU] On Behalf Of Jeff Peterson
    Sent: Thursday, November 05, 2009 9:06 AM
    To: OB@AOMLISTS.PACE.EDU
    Subject: Re: [OB-LIST] Anthropomorphizing Groups, Societies, Organizations

     

    Ronnie, this has been an interesting discussion and I think those interested in this topic might also want look at the literature about emergent phenomena.  One could argue that there is no "group behavior" because it is the individuals that actually behave.  But you could also say that people are made up of brains and limbic systems so really behavior should be studied at the neuronal and chemical level since clearly the neurons firing and chemical reactions are what is causing the person to behave.  One can take this clear down to the gene level saying if we really want to study behavior we need to understand what the genes are doing.  So which of these are right?  It depends on what you are interested in.  The behavior of people is an emergent phenomena of genes and neurons and chemicals, but it does not work very well to study behavior at that level, at least for complex behavior of any interest.  I know some people are working on doing just that and maybe someday we will be able to do it, but there are still many problems.  The emergent literature talks about things like multiple realization, where the same constellation of entities gives rise to different phenomena at the higher level.  Similarly, some organizational phenomena don't exist at the individual level but emerge at the group or organization level.  It makes sense to study the phenomena where it happens regardless of whether sub-phenomena are giving rise to it (which they inevitably are.)  But one has to be careful when specifying what they are studying.  Is culture an average of the individual's beliefs, values and norms, or is it the consensus of those things (we usually use the latter definition).  Measurement issues also arise when one anthropomorphizes without carefully considering the nature of the emerging phenomena.   So, as had been said previously, there emergent processes have properties that are independent though influenced by the parts that make them up.  As such, I think there is value in studying at multiple levels and across levels, but as in all areas, one has to do so carefully and treating an organization just like it was a person completely misses the complex reciprocal interplay between the two.

    Jeff Peterson

    ·       Sawyer 2002 [Emergence is sociology, AJS]
    ·      Chan 1998 [Functional relations among constructs in the same content domain at different levels of analysis, JAP]
    ·      Klein & Kozlowski 2000 [From micro to meso: Critical steps in conceptualizing and conducting multilevel research, ORM]
    ·      Morgenson & Hofmann 1999 [The structure and function of collective constructs, AMR]
    ·       Weick & Roberts 1993 [Collective mind in organizations, ASQ]




    On 11/3/09 3:43 PM, "Romie Littrell" <littrellaom@YAHOO.CO.NZ> wrote:

    I'm critiquing a research paper by a post-graduate student who has referenced a quotation from an article by Gray, Owen & Adams  (1996)  in which they anthropomorphise  "society", explaining society as "a series of social contracts between members of society and society itself". Society is a network of various kinds of linkages where people gather to do things. Society is not a conscious entity that does things of its own volition. Moreover, the things done there are transactions that occur in large numbers, at the volition of many people and institutions, motivated by a diverse array of reasons for engaging in them. People tell me what groups, societies, organisations did today, why it did that, what it is afraid of, what it is struggling to do, or what external influences are preventing it from accomplishing its intent. None of these statements is true. To re-emphasise, an organisation, group, society, or market is a place where people gather to do things, not a conscious entity that does things of its own volition that can be analysed as if it were a human being.

    Any agreement, disagreement, other ideas?

    Gray, R, Owen, D., & Adams, C. (1996). Accounting and Accountability; Changes and Challenges in Corporate Social and Environmental Reporting, Harlow: UK: Prentice-Hall Europe.



    Do not accustom yourself to use big words for little matters.-Samuel Johnson
    Romie F. Littrell, BA, MBA,PhD, FIAIR, An fánaí fiáin  
    AUT Business School N.Z., romie.littrell@aut.ac.nz
    http://www.romielittrellpubs.homestead.com/
    http://www.crossculturalcentre.homestead.com/
    Facilitator, Leadership & Management in Sub-Sahara Africa Conferences
    Contents copyright Romie F. Littrell